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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court allows the Boy Scouts, a private organiza-
t J.D. Candidate 2002, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A. Carleton Col-
lege, 1996. I would like to thank Evan Wolfson for his inspiring work, my parents
for raising me with a sense of justice, and most of all my wife, Melanie, for being
my best friend and supporting me every step of the way.
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tion, to discriminate against gays. It is the Boy Scouts' constitu-
tional right. The Dale decision may not be surprising, but it is dis-
heartening. However, the Minnesota Human Rights Act prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in all publicS 2
accommodations. Although the Boy Scouts itself is not a place of
public accommodation, the government premises that it uses to
conduct meetings are places of public accommodation.
Further, in allowing governmental state entities, such as public
schools, to sponsor Boy Scout troops, Minnesota grants the Boy
Scouts special privileges.' This practice should not, and mostS 4
probably cannot, under a legal challenge continue. This prohibi-
tion would violate no constitutional right of the Boy Scouts.'
Rather, the Boy Scouts can discriminate against gays; however, it
simply needs to go elsewhere to conduct its activities.
This article begins with a history of the constitutional right to
expressive association and explores the evolution of this right from
the textually guaranteed rights of freedom of speech and freedom
to peaceably assemble.6
Following the history of this constitutional right is a descrip-
tion of the Dale case.' Through careful analysis of the majority
opinion and a particularly impassioned, cogent dissent, the article
continues, determining that the Dale holding is based on flawed
S 8
reasoning.
Finally, the last section of this article addresses the question of
what happens next in Minnesota.9 Ostensibly, this final section of
the note is the most valuable since it provides insight into the
state's legal reactions and responses to the Dale decision. The State
should and most likely can enjoin the Boy Scouts from using cer-
1. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2457 (2000). The United
States Reporter citation was unavailable at the time of publication. This article ref-
erences two cases involving James Dale, the New Jersey Supreme Court case and
the United States Supreme Court case. The full citations are easily distinguish-
able. In short form citations, I have referred to the New Jersey case as Boy Scouts
and the United States case as Dale.
2. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West, WESTLAW through 1999 Reg. Sess.).
3. Infra Part IV.B.1-2.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Infra Part II.A-D.
7. Infra Part III.A-B.
8. Infra Part IV.A.
9. Infra Part IV.B.
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tain state resources to promulgate its message.1O
II. HISTORY
A. Early Predecessors Of The Right To Expressive Association
"Expressive association" may be relatively new terminology, but
the Supreme Court has recognized a right to freedom of associa-
tion for many years." Although not an explicitly guaranteed consti-
tutional right, freedom of association has its roots in the Constitu-
tional rights of freedom of speech and freedom to peaceably
assemble.12 Interestingly, two of the most cited cases in the 1920s
and 1930s upholding these freedoms involved the Protection of the
rights of members of communist organizations. In Gitlow, the
Court held that the state might engage in actions towards self-
preservation in response to a threat of a communist revolution
without violating the Constitution.1 4  In the second communist
case, Dejonge, the Court held that peaceable assembly is constitu-
tionally permitted even if participants are discussing objectives of
the Communist party.15
Later, these same rights were guaranteed to racist and anti-16
semitic groups such as the Ku Klux Klan. In the grotesque facts of
Brandenburg, a leader of the Ku Klux Klan was convicted under an
Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute for advocating the necessity of
violence in two different films. 7 The films depicted twelve hooded
Klan members surrounding a burning cross. Later the film fea-
10. Id.
11. Roberts v. U.S.Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (citations omitted).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id. Here, the
Framers created a right to peaceably assemble, but there is no mention of a free-
dom of association. In Gitlow, the Court recognized that freedom of speech is one
of the fundamental rights and liberties that are guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). Twelve years later,
the Court held that the "right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of
free speech ... and is equally fundamental." Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364
(1937).
13. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 663; DeJonge, 299 U.S. at 365.
14. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 668.
15. Deonge, 299 U.S. at 365.
16. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969).
17. Id. at 444-45.
18. Id. at 445.
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tured a vitriolic hate speech with numerous racial and anti-semitic
slurs including suggestions of killing Blacks and Jews.' 9 The Court
struck down Ohio's act holding that the act forbids assembly. °
"Statutes affecting the right of assembly, like those touching on
freedom of speech must observe the established distinctions be-
tween mere advocacy and incitement to imminent lawless action
,,21
One may get a sense that the Court has an absolutist view of
First Amendment rights-that it holds First Amendment rights
above all else. Does the Court ever limit an individual's First
Amendment rights? The answer is "yes"; the Court has limited an
individual's First Amendment rights. To be sure, the Court treads
carefully in this area and only restricts rights in situations of grave
23abuse. For example, in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, the Court held that local West Virginia authorities could
not compel Jehovah's Witness members to salute the flag at
school.24 These rights, the Court continued, are "susceptible of re-
striction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests
which the state may lawfully protect."
25
B. The Right To Freely Associate And The Civil Rights Movement
One of the seminal cases, NAACP v. Alabama, not only demon-
strated the Court's strong reluctance to curtail the freedom of asso-
26ciation, but also played a critical role in the civil rights movement.
In NAACP, the state of Alabama attempted to coerce the NAACP
into turning over its membership list to the state. Alabama
claimed that the NAACP was violating a state statute, which re-
quired most out-of-state corporations to file a corporate charter
with the Secretary of State and to designate a location to receive
service of process. Further, Alabama claimed that the NAACP'sviolation resulted in irreparable harm to the people and property
19. Id. at 446.
20. Id. at 448.
21. Id. at 449 n.4.
22. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668 (1925); infra note 34.
23. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); see also
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
24. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
25. Id. at 639.
26. 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
27. Id. at 453.
28. Id. at 451.
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of the state.29 After litigation began in the case, Alabama moved for
the production of lists of all members of the NAACP residing in the
state."' The NAACP refused, asserting that this production would
substantially impede individual freedom to associate." Simply,
people would be afraid to meet.
The Court accepted the NAACP's assertion, and held that the
production of these documents would violate NAACP members'
32constitutional right to associate. In its decision, the Court specifi-
cally recognized that the members' rights would likely be violated
because past revelations of members' names had resulted in eco-
nomic detriment, loss of employment, threats of physical force, and
other occurrences of public hostility.
3
While the civil rights movement benefited from the Court's
protection of the freedom of association in NAACP, the civil rights
movement also benefited from both the Court's unwillingness to
find constitutional protection for statutes prohibiting mixed-race
marriages and the Court's unwillingness to find constitutional pro-
tection for school discrimination based on race.34
The Court forcefully rejected the idea of interpreting the con-
stitutional rights as absolute rights; however, this did not indicate
that the Court was eroding the sanctity of associational freedom. In
Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin, the Court held that
Wisconsin could not force the National Democratic Party to seat
Wisconsin delegates at its convention if the Wisconsin delegates
were chosen in a manner contrary to the national party's rules. 6
The Court reasoned that if Wisconsin was permitted to seat its
delegates, the constitutional associational freedom of the Democ-
ratic Party would be violated.37  As the Court eloquently wrote,
"Freedom of association would prove an empty guarantee if associa-
tions could not limit control over their decisions to those who share
29. Id. at 452.
30. Id. at 453.
31. Id. at460.
32. Id. at 462.
33. Id.
34. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976) (holding that a school that
discriminates on the basis of race is afforded no affirmative constitutional protec-
tion); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding the prohibition of mixed
race marriages unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment).
35. Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 124-25
(1981).
36. Id. at 125-26.
37. Id. at 126.
20011 2073
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the interests and persuasions that underlie the association's be-
ing."8
C. The Roberts Case-The Right To Expressive Association
In a landmark case, the Roberts Court held that a Minnesota
state statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex applied
to the Jaycees, even if a slight infringement on the members' con-
stitutional right to expressive association occurred.39  The Court
cited three reasons for its decision: (1) Minnesota has a compelling
interest in eradicating sexism; (2) the Human Rights Act is not
aimed at suppressing freedom of speech; and (3) the state ad-40
vanced this goal with the least restrictive means. Further, the
Court noted that permitting women in the organization effectuates
no change in the message that the Jaycees are attempting to send.a'
Clearly, the Roberts Court valued Minnesota's interest in elimi-
nating sexism when rendering its decision. Again, three years later
in Duarte, the Court reaffirmed its belief that a slight infringement
on a group member's right of expressive association is permitted if
the state has a compelling interest in eliminating discrimination42
against women. Yet a third time, in 1988, the Court affirmed the
two previous holdings and even expanded the doctrine. In New
York State Club Ass'n, the Court held that a New York City law pro-
hibiting discriminatory practices against women and minorities did
not violate an individual club members' constitutional right to ex-S • 44
pressive association. By 1988, the law was clear: state and even city
interests are extremely important in considering whether a city or
state law violates an individual's constitutional right to expressive• • 45
association. Simply, a state may have an overriding interest in
eradicating some form of discrimination that will permit it to for-
bid certain public groups from discriminating against women and
38. Id. at 122 n.22 (quoting L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 791
(1978)).
39. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
40. Id. at 623-28; see also M. Page Kelley, Roberts v. United States Jaycees: How
Much Help for Women?, 8 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 215, 221-22 (1985).
41. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628.
42. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549
(1987).
43. N.Y. State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 5-6, 13 (1988).
44. Id. at 8.
45. Supra notes 39-40, 42-43.
2074 [Vol. 27:3
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minorities.46 In these cases, a slight infringement on the constitu-S 41
tional rights of the parties will be permitted.
D. Epilogue-The Law Remains The Same
In 1995, the Court ruled that a homosexual group could not
march in a St. Patrick's Day parade. 4s The Court reasoned that
forcing the parade organizers to allow this group to march in-
fringed on the organizers' First Amendment right to free speech.49
The Court found that Massachusetts' application of its anti-
discrimination statute was unconstitutional. Essentially, the law
could not force the parade organizers to send a message of accep-
tance and tolerance of gays even if this is a socially encouraged be-
havior.5 ' However, the Court reaffirmed its previous holding that,
as a general matter, anti-discrimination statutes do not violate First
Amendment rights and the state has compelling interest in having
these types of laws.5'
III. THE DALE DECISION
A. The Facts
James Dale joined Monmouth Council Cub Scout Pack 142 in
1978 at the age of eight.53  In becoming a member of the Boy
Scouts three years later, Dale entered into the great American tra-
54dition of scouting. Dale was an exemplary scout, earning twenty-
five merit badges in his ten years as an active youth scout.55 He
reached the pinnacle of his scouting career in 1988 when he
46. Supra notes 39-40.
47. Id.
48. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 580-81 (1995).
49. Id. at 573-74.
50. Id. at 573.
51. Id. at 579.
52. Id. at 572.
53. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2449 (2000).
54. Id. at 2460 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d
1196, 1200-01 (NJ. 1999), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000). "BSA membership is an
American tradition. Since the program's inception in 1910 through the beginning
of this decade, over eighty-seven million youths and adults have joined BSA. As of
December 1992, over four million youths and over one million adults were active
BSA members." Id. at 1200.
55. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2460.
2001] 2075
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earned the prestigious Eagle Scout Bad e.56 Only three percent of
all scouts earn the rank of Eagle Scout. The Boy Scouts approved
58
Dale's application for adult membership in 1989. Dale became
the Assistant Scoutmaster for Troop 73, his former youth troop.'9
About this same time, Dale moved away from home to attend
Rutgers University. Shortly after arriving at college, Dale ac-61
knowledged to himself, friends, and family that he was gay. As the
co-president of the Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay Alliance, he
became active in the gay community; in July 1990 he attended a
seminar that addressed the psychological and health needs of les-
62
bian and gay teenagers. During the event, a newspaper reporter
interviewed Dale, who spoke candidly about the difficulty he ex-
perienced coming to terms with his homosexuality. 63 In July 1990,
the newspaper published the article with a photograph of James
Dale identifying him as the co-president of the Rutgers Les-
bian/Gay Alliance. 64
After the publication of the article, Dale received a letter from
Boy Scouts' Monmouth Council Executive James Kay revoking his
65Boy Scout membership. In response to this letter, Dale wrote to
66
Kay in early August inquiring about the reason for his dismissal.
Kay replied that the Boy Scouts forbid membership to homosexu-
als.67
56. Boy Scouts, 734 A.2d at 1204. It is clear from the record that Dale deserved
to be recognized in the top three percent of scouts as he had acted as an Assistant
Patrol Leader, Patrol Leader, Bugler, andJunior Assistant Scoutmaster. Id.
57. Id.
58. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2449.
59. Id.
60. Id.; Boy Scouts, 734 A.2d at 1204.
61. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2449; Boy Scouts, 734 A.2d at 1204.
62. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2449.
63. Id. James Dale, 19, co-president of the Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay
Alliance said he lived a double life while in high school, pretending to be straight
while attending a military academy. He remembered dating girls and even laugh-
ing at homophobicjokes while at school, only admitting his homosexuality during
his second year at Rutgers. Kinga Borondy, Seminar Addresses Needs of Homosexual
Teens, NEWARK STAR LEDGER, July 8, 1990, § 2, at 11. The article further demon-
strated the need for assistance for gay and lesbian teens pointing out that twenty to
thirty-five percent of gay and lesbian teens have attempted suicide. Id.
64. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2449; Borondy, supra note 63, at 11.
65. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2449.
66. Id.
67. Id. Dale has mentioned numerous times that the skills he gained from
the Boy Scouts are what gave him the courage to acknowledge his sexual orienta-
tion. Ironically, the very organization that facilitated a difficult time in his life
would be the same organization that would revoke his membership. Interview
[Vol. 27:32076
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B. Procedural Facts
1. The New Jersey Superior Court
In July 1992, Dale commenced an action against the Boy
Scouts in the New Jersey Superior Court.6 Both Dale and the Boy
Scouts moved for summary judgment.69 The court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the Boy Scouts.7° Further, the court
concluded that the Boy Scouts had a clear policy of excluding ho-
mosexuals. Therefore, the First Amendment freedom of expres-
sive association protected the Boy Scouts from being forced to ac-
cept Dale, an avowed homosexual, as an assistant scout leader.72
2. The New Jersey Superior Court-Appellate Division
The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of Dale's com-
mon law claim.7 ' However, the Appellate Division reversed and
with Evan Wolfson, Attorney for James Dale and Senior Staff Attorney, Lambda
Legal Defense and Education Fund in New York City, N.Y. (July 20, 2000).
68. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2449. Dale asserted that the Boy Scouts had violated
NewJersey's public accommodations statute as well as the common law of NewJer-
sey when it revoked his membership based on his sexual orientation. Id. at 2449-
50. NewJersey's public accommodations statute reads in relevant part:
All persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment, and to ob-
tain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any
place of public accommodation ... without discrimination because of
race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, affec-
tional or sexual orientation, familial status, or sex, subject only to condi-
tions and limitations applicable alike to all persons. This opportunity is
recognized as and declared to be a civil right.
Law Against Discrimination, N.J. SrAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1993).
69. Boy Scouts, 734 A.2d at 1205.
70. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2450. The court did not apply New Jersey's public ac-
commodations law because the Boy Scouts is not a place of public accommoda-
tion. Id. Alternatively, the Boy Scouts is a "distinctly private group" and is "ex-
empted from coverage under New Jersey's law." Id. Further, the court rejected
Dale's claim that there is a common law claim based in public policy. Instead, the
court held that NewJersey's public policy is based on the public accommodations
law and because the public accommodations law does not apply, there is no com-
mon law claim. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. The First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
73. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270, 293 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1998), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
20011 2077
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remanded the rest of Dale's claims for further proceedings.14 The
court rejected the Boy Scouts' federal constitutional claims of free-
dom of expressive association.
7 5
3. The New Jersey Supreme Court
In a unanimous seven to zero decision, the New Jersey Su-•. 76
preme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division.
The court held that the Boy Scouts is a place of public accommoda-
tion and therefore, the public accommodations law applies to theS 77
organization. Further, the Boy Scouts are not exempt from the
public accommodations law under any of the exceptions of the
law.
78
74. Id.
75. Id. In its decision, the court reasoned about the constitutional claims:
In our view, there is a patent inconsistency in a notion that a gay scout
leader who keeps his secret hidden may remain in scouting and the one
who adheres to the scout laws by being honest and courageous enough to
declare his homosexuality publicly must be expelled. We also cannot ac-
cept the proposition that the BSA has a constitutional privilege of exclud-
ing a gay person when the sole basis for the exclusion is the gay's exercise
of his own First Amendment right to speak honestly about himself.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
76. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2450.
77. Id.
78. Id. The exceptions to the New Jersey public accommodations law are
stated in the law as follows:
Nothing herein [in the statute] contained shall be construed to include
or to apply to any institution, bona fide club, or place of accommodation
which is in its nature distinctly private; nor shall anything herein con-
tained apply to any educational facility operated or maintained by a bona
fide religious or sectarian institution, and the right of a natural parent or
one in loco parentis to direct the education and upbringing of a child
under his control is hereby affirmed; nor shall anything herein contained
be construed to bar any private secondary or post secondary school from
using in good faith criteria other than race, creed, color, national origin,
ancestry or affectional or sexual orientation in the admission of students.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(1) (West 1993).
Specifically, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the assertion that the Boy
Scouts were exempt because they were a "distinctly private" organization. Dale v.
Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1217 (N.J. 1999), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
We reject the suggestion that the BSA organization as a whole is not a
place of public accommodation because more stringent membership cri-
teria are applied to a single component of the organization, its adult
members .... An extension of defendants' argument would be that the
BSA is not a place of public accommodation because of the demanding
standards that must be met to become an Eagle Scout.
Id. Obviously, it is an absurd suggestion that an organization is not a place of
public accommodation simply because certain members must meet very high
2078 [Vol. 27:3
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As to the federal constitutional claims, the court separated the
claim into two distinct issues: (1) the right to intimate association,
and (2) the right to expressive association. 9 The court held that
the Boy Scouts did not warrant constitutional protection for the
right to intimate association because of its nonselective nature.
80
Specifically, the court held that the large size, inclusive nature, and
the permitting of nonmembers to attend meetings demonstrate
that the Boy Scouts are not so personal or so private as to merit
constitutional protection.8
Similarly, the court held that reinstating Dale to member
status would not infringe on the Boy Scouts' right of expressive as-
sociation. 2 The court did agree that the Boy Scouts instill moral
beliefs in its members, but the Boy Scouts are far from being an or-
ganization whose central goal or theme is to unite in opposition
against homosexuality.
In addition, the court found that NewJersey had a compelling
interest in eliminating the harmful effects of discrimination, even if
this meant a slight infringement on the Boy Scouts' constitutional
rights.'
4. The United States Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court reversed the New Jersey Su-
standards. The court recognized this absurdity by suggesting another exam-
ple where a public pool would not be considered a place of public accommo-
dation because the member lifeguards must meet more stringent criteria. Id.
79. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2450.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. "That Boy Scout members do not associate to share the view that ho-
mosexuality is immoral suggests that Dale's expulsion constituted discrimination
based solely on his status as an openly gay man." Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734
A.2d 1196, 1225 (N.J. 1999), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000). An illustrative example
of a group that would arguably be protected by the right of expressive association
would be the Ku Klux Klan; Klan members meet to promote white supremacy.
Elaine Cunningham, Duty Bound: To Help Her Client Fight the Boy Scouts'Sexual Orien-
tation Discrimination, Lawyer Andrea Spalla Followed the Organization's Own Advice: Be
Prepared, CARLETON COLLEGE VOICE, Winter 2000, at 18 (on file with author). This
article is an interview with Andrea Spalla, an alumna of Carleton College. Along
with Evan Wolfson, Spalla represented plaintiffJames Dale. Id.
84. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1227-28 (N.J. 1999), rev'd, 120
S. Ct. 2446 (2000). Although the court did concede that the ruling might infringe
slightly on the right to free speech, the court held that the New Jersey public ac-
commodations law "abridges no more speech than is necessary to accomplish its
purpose." Id.
20011 2079
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preme Court.s5 The Court held that New Jersey cannot force the
Boy Scouts to accept members whose membership would jeopard-
ize the organization's message.86 However, this freedom of expres-
sive association is not absolute. To even reach the stage where it
must be determined whether the Boy Scouts' right to expressive as-
sociation was infringed, the Court first examined if the Boy Scouts
even engage in expressive association. The Court concluded that
the Boy Scouts engage in expressive association based on the Scout
Laws and Scout Oath. The Boy Scouts asserted and the Court ac-
85. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2458.
86. Id. In addition to this potential derogation of the organization, the Court
also cautions that the law must avoid "interfer[ing] with speech for no better rea-
son than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one, how-
ever enlightened either purpose may strike the government." Id. at 2458 (quoting
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 579
(1995)).
87. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2451. The Court cites Roberts, underscoring the fact that
the Court is willing to override constitutional rights when there are compelling
state interests that merit this action. Id. (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 623 (1984)). The Roberts Court held that the Jaycees could not discriminate
against women, thus ignoring the Minnesota Human Rights Act, because "Minne-
sota's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its female citizens
justifies the impact that application of the statute to the Jaycees may have on the
male members' associational freedoms." Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 (1984).
88. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2451. The Court is absolutely correct in reasoning that
to render ajudicious verdict, the Court must make an exhaustive review of the fac-
tual record. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 567-68; see also Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc.
v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of
U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984). "[T]he rule is that we examine for ourselves
the statements in issue and the circumstances which they are made to see ...
whether they are of a character which the principles of the First Amend-
ment... protect." N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964) (quoting
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946)).
89. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2451-52. The Scout Laws and Scout Oath are quite
lengthy, but a thorough reading of them is required to understand and ultimately
reject the Court's majority opinion. "Scout Oath: On my honor I will do my best
to do my duty to God and my country and to obey the Scout Law; to help other
people at all times; to keep myself physically strong, mentally awake, and morally
straight." Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1202 (N.J. 1999), rev'd, 120 S.
Ct. 2446 (2000).
Scout Law:
A scout is TRUSTWORTHY. A Scout tells the truth. He keeps his prom-
ises. Honesty is a part of his code of conduct. People can always depend
on him.
A Scout is LOYAL. A Scout is true to his family, friends, Scout leaders,
school, nation, and world community.
A scout is HELPFUL. A Scout is concerned about other people. He will-
ingly volunteers to help others without expecting payment or reward.
A Scout is FRIENDLY. A Scout is a friend to all. He is a brother to other
2080 [Vol. 27:3
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cepted the belief that homosexuality conflicts with the Boy Scout
Law on being "morally straight" and "clean."90 The Court found
that the Boy Scouts have consistently promulgated a position reject-
ing homosexuality as a legitimate lifestyle.9' Therefore, the Court
held that if Dale was reinstated as an assistant scoutmaster, the Boy
Scouts would be forced to convey a message that homosexuality is a
legitimate lifestyle, which is in direct conflict with its professed be-
liefs.9' The Court concluded the federal constitutional rights dis-
Scouts. He seeks to understand others. He respects those with ideas and
customs that are different from his own.
A Scout is COURTEOUS. A Scout is polite to everyone regardless of age
or position. He knows that good manners make it easier for people to
get along together.
A Scout is KIND. A Scout understands there is strength in being gentle.
He treats others as he wants to be treated. He does not harm or kill any-
thing without reason.
A Scout is OBEDIENT. A Scout follows the rules of the family, school,
and troop. He obeys the laws of his community and country. If he thinks
these rules and laws are unfair, he tries to have them changed in an or-
derly manner rather than disobey them.
A Scout is CHEERFUL. A Scout looks for the bright side of life. He
cheerfully does tasks that come his way. He tries to make others happy.
A Scout is THRIFTY. A Scout works to pay his way and to help others.
He saves for the future. He protects and conserves natural resources. He
carefully uses time and property.
A Scout is BRAVE. A Scout can face danger even if he is afraid. He has
the courage to stand for what he thinks is right even if others laugh at
him or threaten him.
A Scout is CLEAN. A Scout keeps his body and mind fit and clean. He
goes around with those who believe in living by these same ideals. He
keeps his home and community clean.
A Scout is REVERENT. A Scout is reverent toward God. He is faithful in
his religious duties. He respects the beliefs of others.
Id.
90. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2452-53. "We believe that homosexual conduct is in-
consistent with the requirement in the Scout Oath that a Scout be morally straight
and in the Scout Law that a Scout be clean in word and deed . Id. at 2453
(quoting United States Supreme Court Pet'r Br. at 6, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale,
120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000) (No. 99-699)).
91. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2453.
92. Id. at 2454. Here, the Court relies heavily on Hurley. In that case, the
Court held that an Irish gay, lesbian, and bisexual group could not march in a St.
Patrick's Day parade because the group's inclusion in the parade would violate the
First Amendment freedom of speech right of the parade organizers. Hurley, 515
U.S. at 580-81. Simply, it is a parade organizer's prerogative as to what message he
or she chooses to convey or chooses not to convey. Id. at 575. In the present case,
the Court analogized that the Boy Scouts are in the same position as the parade
organizers; an inclusion of Dale would force the Boy Scouts to promulgate a point
of view contrary to its beliefs. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2454.
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cussion in holding that the Boy Scouts is an expressive association
and that any forced inclusion or reinstatement of Dale would in-
fringe on this First Amendment right.
9 3
Lastly, the Court determined that New Jersey's Public Accom-
modations Law is not applicable to the case at bar for fear of in-
fringement on First Amendment rights.94
IV. THE ANALYSIS
A. The Dale Holding
The Dale holding is a wrong decision. First, it is based on a
questionable reading and misunderstanding of the facts.95 Second,
the Court repeatedly concocts the same incessantly trite argu-
ment.9 6 Third, the decision not so subtly drips with an underlying
indifference, if not enmity, towards the rights of gays.97
The Court duly noted that it has an obligation to review the
98
factual record. In its review, the Court relied on a few suspect
documents and found that the Boy Scouts had a clearly established
policy that forbade homosexuality. 9  Specifically, the Court used
93. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2455. In reaching this conclusion, the Court asserts that
there are three reasons why the forced inclusion of Dale will convey an undesir-
able message: 1) a group does not have to associate for the sole purpose of dis-
seminating a certain message to maintain First Amendment protections; 2) even if
the Boy Scouts discourage adult members from discussing sexual issues, youth
scouts under the supervision of a gay scout leader will presumably receive a "gay"
message; and 3) not every person of a group has to maintain the same belief in
order for the organization as a whole to be entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion. Id. at 2454-55. Here, the Court is stating that the Boy Scouts' First Amend-
ment rights will be infringed if Dale is an assistant scoutmaster. Id. at 2455. Nota-
bly and curiously, the Court offers no legal support for any of these three reasons.
94. Id. at 2457.
95. Infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
96. Infra note 125.
97. Infra note 127.
98. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2451. In Sullivan, the Court held that an examination
of the facts in a case involving constitutional issues is necessary to ensure that
there is no suppression of constitutional rights. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 285 (1964). The Court recognized that the Seventh Amendment states
that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the
United States ...." Id. at 285 n.26. However, the Court went on to conclude that
there may be some instances where a federal right is at issue and the Court must
examine the facts to make a decision on the federal question. Id. In Sullivan, a
widely known case that advanced the civil rights movement, the Court's bold deci-
sion to reexamine the facts eventually led to a landmark decision that protected
the New York Times newspaper from an alleged claim of libel. Id. at 286.
99. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2453.
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two documents to support this assertion, both of which are suspi-
cious. The first document is a 1978 position statement to the Boy
Scouts' Executive Committee stating that homosexuals are not ap-
propriate leaders in scouting. 00 However this document was not a
publicly distributed document, in fact, it was more like a secret
document.'0' Admittedly, a statement that is not disseminated is
not automatically rendered meaningless. However, it is unusual
that the Court would find that an unknown policy of discrimination
against homosexuals directly in opposition with the Boy Scouts'
widely proclaimed message of inclusion of all boys and young men
is compelling evidence of the Boy Scouts anti-gay position.' 2
The second, yet equally dubious document the Court relies on
is a 1991 position statement and its subsequent revisions.03 How-
ever, this document and its descendants are clearly questionable in, 
e104
that they were promulgated after Dale's expulsion.
In addition to its reliance on formal documents, the Court as-
serted that homosexuality is not compatible with the Scout Oath
and Law. 105 The Court's flawed review of the factual record was
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2463 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2453.
104. Id. at 2464 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 2452. Specifically, the Court reasonably held that some people
would interpret the words "morally straight" and "clean" in the Scout Oath and
Law to signify the encouragement of heterosexuality. Id. However, without any
demonstration that the BSA had ever intended the word "straight" and "clean" to
refer to heterosexuality, the Court accepted the BSA's contention at face value
that these words were implicitly encouraging heterosexuality. Id. at 2453. The
problem with this reasoning is that the Court failed to address the BSA's explicit
explanation of the words "morally straight" and "clean" that appeared in its very
own publications. Id. at 2461-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting). When describing the
term "morally straight," the Scoutmaster Handbook states, "In any consideration
of moral fitness, a key word has to be 'courage.' A boy's courage to do what his
head and his heart tell him is right. And the courage to refuse to do what his
heart and his head say is wrong." Id. at 2461 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
App. at 239-40). With regards to the term "clean," the Boy Scout Handbook states,
"A Scout keeps his body and mind fit and clean ... You never need to be ashamed
of dirt that will wash off ... There's another kind of dirt that won't come off by
washing. It is the kind that shows up in foul language and harmful thoughts." Id.
at 2461 (quoting App. at 225-26). Further, a suggested lesson on how to teach the
meaning of "clean" involves using two pots, one dirty on the outside and clean on
the inside, the other clean on the outside and dirty on the inside. The lesson
demonstrates that a scout can easily clean his outside, but one must be determined
to keep his inside clean. Id. at 2461 n.2 (citing App. 289-90). Obviously, the BSA's
own definitions of "morally straight" and "clean" do not make any implicit or ex-
plicit reference to sexual orientation. Id. at 2461.
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perpetuated by the Court's unsupported view that the Court must
accept the Boy Scouts of America's statements about the facts at
face value. 1
06
Other than these few documents, the Court relied on a Cali-
fornia case to demonstrate the Boy Scouts' disapproval of homo-
sexuality.1 7 However, this California case relied on unusual reason-
ing as well. 108 In Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of
America, the court held that the California Unruh Civil Rights Act
cannot com el the Boy Scouts to accept members who express con-
trary views. However, in the court's conclusion, it ponders
whether the NAACP could be forced to accept a Ku Klux Klan
member or if B'nai B'rith could be forced to accept an anti-
semite.10 Obviously, the court is struggling with a constitutional
question. Not only is it offensive for the California Supreme Court
to compare a person of different sexual orientation to a person
committed to tenets of bigotry, but wouldn't a much more compa-
rable question be: Can theJaycees exclude women? Can the Rotary
Club exclude women? Can private New York clubs, which benefit
the business community, discriminate in their memberships? In-
terestingly, but not surprisingly, the Supreme Court has answered
all of these questions and the answer has been "no" each time."
The Court reviewed the facts, but the review seems problem-
atic in that the Court did not review all of the facts, especially those
facts suggesting that the Boy Scouts have not disseminated a consis-
tent policy of disapproval of homosexuality. For example, the
Court discussed the Boy Scout Oath and Law and surmised that
some people may construe the terms "morally straight" and "clean"
106. Id.
107. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2453. Here, the Court cites the 1998 Curran decision.
Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218 (Cal.
1998).
108. Curran, 952 P.2d at 257.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. N.Y. State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1988)
(holding that New York City's human rights law prohibiting discrimination in
membership in certain clubs does not violate the clubs' constitutional rights); Bd.
of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549-50 (1987) (hold-
ing the California Unruh Civil Rights Act serves a compelling state interest when it
is used to compel the Rotary Club to allow women members, and therefore the Act
does not violate the Rotary's constitutional rights); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 630-31 (1984) (holding that Minnesota's Human Rights Act is not too
broad in compelling the Jaycees to allow women to join, and therefore does not
infringe on theJaycees' constitutional rights).
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.. 112to signify discouragement of homosexuality. However, the Court
made no attempt at all to discern the meaning of how some people
would construe the term "brave" or "trustworthy. 113
Even with the flawed factual analysis, it is possible that the
Court may have pointed to overwhelming legal precedent or public
policy that would support the holding in favor of the Boy Scouts.
However, the Court did not do this; the Court never addressed New
Jersey's interest in eliminating discrimination against gays.114 All
this in spite of the fact that there is much evidence suggesting that
this type of discrimination renders harmful effects. A few of the
deleterious effects of this type of discrimination include discrimina-
tion in employment and housing, consistent occurrences of verbal
harassment, and the occurrence of crimes against people because
of sexual orientation.115 For example, in 1998, 1,248 hate crimes
were reported against gay men, lesbians, or bisexuals.16 NWhile
numbers are not particularly persuasive without some context in
which to compare them, it would seem apparent to the average
reader that the occurrence of over twelve hundred crimes based on
one's sexual orientation is far too many. Plus, a brief of the Ameri-
can Psychological Association notes the figure is probably low be-
112. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2452.
113. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1202 (N.J. 1999), rev'd, 120 S.
Ct. 2446 (2000). The Boy Scout Handbook defines the term "brave" as having the
"courage to stand for what he thinks is right even if others laugh at him or
threaten him." Id. The Boy Scout Handbook defines the term "trustworthy" as
someone who is honest "as part of his code of conduct." Id. When reading these
definitions, one cannot help but think that some would argue that James Dale
acted both brave and trustworthy, under the Boy Scout Handbooks' definition,
when he revealed his homosexuality. However, the Court never addressed this
possible interpretation of those terms. In fact, the Court ignored this part of the
Boy Scout Handbook altogether.
114. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2456-57. Here, the Court recognizes that in previous
cases, it has held that states have compelling interests in eradicating discrimina-
tion. Id. at 2456. "By prohibiting gender discrimination in places of public ac-
commodation, the Minnesota Act protects the State's citizenry from a number of
serious social and personal harms .... It [discrimination] thereby both deprives
persons of their individual dignity and denies society the benefits of wide partici-
pation in political, economic, and cultural life." Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 625 (1984). Further, in Duarte, the Court cited a study by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce to bolster the contention that allowing women in Rotary Clubs
will lead to a more representative group of community leaders. Duarte, 481 U.S. at
549 n.7 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTIcAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 400 (1986)).
115. Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association in Support of Resp't
at 26, Boy Scouts, 734 A.2d at 1200-01.
116. Id. at 27.
20011 2085
17
LaMere: Constitutional Law—Scouting: Be Prepared Minnesota
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
cause of variation in reporting methods as well as victims' hesita-
tion to report the crimes for fear of retribution or retaliation."'
Additionally, these types of crimes are often unusually gory.'8
In the Dale decision, the Court relied on case after case hold-
ing that discrimination renders deleterious effects on the people of
a particular state. 19 Therefore, the Court held that laws forbidding
discrimination are enforceable and do not infringe on an organiza-
tion's First Amendment rights to freedom of expressive associa-
tion. 1
20
To come to its conclusion in the current case, the Court as-
serted that forcing the Boy Scouts to accept a gay assistant scout
leader would force the Boy Scouts to give an inherently different
121message than the message that the Boy Scouts intended. In sup-
port of this, the Court notes its previous holding that a parade or-
ganizer cannot be forced to include a group, if that group's inclu-
sion will convey a message that the organizer does not wish toS122
send. As before, here the Court relied on a case with facts very
117. Id.
118. Anthony S. Winer, Hate Crimes, Homosexuals, and the Constitution, 29 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 387, 410 (1994). One particularly gruesome example from 1992:
Schindler had recently told his commander he was gay and wanted an administra-
tive discharge. Meanwhile, word of his homosexuality and impending discharge
spread throughout the ship's crew. The murder of Schindler [a gay Navy seaman]
was unprovoked and especially brutal. Helvey [the assailant] later described how
he had kneed Schindler in the groin, punched him in the face, and cradled
Schindler's neck and head in his left arm as he punched him repeatedly in the
face. Helvey said he then brought Schindler down to the floor, where he stomped
on his face and chest with his feet. Schindler was so disfigured by the beating that
his mother could recognize him only by the tattoos on his arms; the Navy said that
his skull was battered, that most of his ribs were broken. The physician who per-
formed the autopsy said that Schindler's lungs were bruised and his liver was com-
pletely destroyed. The brutal characteristics of Schindler's murder are consistent
with many anti-gay hate crimes, wherein perpetrators evince 'the absolute intent to
rub out the human being because of his sexual preference.' Id. at 411-12 (cita-
tions omitted).
119. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2456 (citing N.Y. State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New
York, 487 U.S. 1, 14 n. 5 (1988); Duarte, 481 U.S. at 549; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 625).
120. Supra note 111 and accompanying text.
121. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2454. "Dale's presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the
very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the youth members
and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate
form of behavior." Id. at 2454.
122. Id. at 2454. In Hurley, the Court permitted the organizers of the St. Pat-
rick's Day Parade, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, to exclude the
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston from marching in the
parade because the forced inclusion would violate the organizers' First Amend-
ment rights. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515
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different than the case at bar. James Dale never proposed, sug-
gested, or intimated that he wanted to engage in any kind of gay
activism while acting in his capacity as an assistant scout leader. He
certainly never proposed to march in a Boy Scout parade pro-
nouncing his sexual orientation. Obviously, it is absurd to liken
Dale's desire to work as an assistant scoutmaster to that of a gay,
lesbian, and bisexual's group desire to march in a parade.
Dale sought to work for the Boy Scouts while maintaining a
lifestyle led with integrity about who he was. In other words, he did
not plan on concealing his sexual orientation any more than he
planned on proclaiming his sexual orientation. On the other
hand, the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Bos-
ton was formed for the purpose of marching in the parade and to
demonstrate the support for these individuals within the commu-
nity. 12 Clearly, these cases are distinguishable and the Court's reli-
ance is misplaced.
24
The Court's repeated statements about its hesitation to force
the Boy Scouts' to accept Dale is trite, especially because the Court
never exactly specifies what message the retention of Dale would
convey. Not only does the Court repeat itself again and again, as
U.S. 557, 569-70 (1995). The Court correctly held that, "when dissemination of a
view contrary to one's own is forced upon a speaker intimately connected with the
communication advanced, the speaker's right to autonomy over the message is
compromised." Id. at 576.
123. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 570.
124. Lest one think that this research has been conducted in pursuit of pro-
moting some previously held liberal agenda, I would counter this assertion argu-
ing that the Court likely decided the Hurley case correctly even though in my mind
there is no question that discrimination was involved in the facts of the case. Sim-
ply, it is true that the forced inclusion of a group in a parade might infringe on
one's First Amendment rights. As the Court eloquently held in Pacific Gas, "one
important manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who chooses to
speak may also decide what not to say." Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573 (citing Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986) (internal quotations
omitted)).
125. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2453-55. In this part of the decision, the Court repeats
in three separate places that the inclusion of Dale will force the Boy Scouts to send
a message, which they choose not to send. It is not clear what exactly the offend-
ing message would be. Reliance on Hurley offers no help because Dale did not
join the Boy Scouts for the purpose of showing acceptance of gays. Rather, is one
to assume that a gay assistant scoutmaster teaches the Scout Oath and Law differ-
ently? If this is true, why didn't the Boy Scouts enter this in the factual record?
Further, if a homosexual's presence in the organization so changes the message
the Boy Scouts are sending as to violate its constitutional rights, why didn't any-
body notice this obvious fact that the Boy Scouts were sending out a message that
homosexual conduct was a legitimate form of behavior before the newspaper arti-
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if to convince itself of the decision, but also there is blatant over-
sight of New Jersey's compelling interest in eliminating discrimina-
tion.126
Perhaps this oversight is merely that, an oversight, or perhaps
this case represents something more insidious in our society, apa-
thy towards the rights of gays. It is hard to know what kind of role
this apathy plays in the decisions of the Court; however some of the
clues we do have about the Court's opinions sug7est that there is an
underlying misunderstanding toward gay issues.
cle identifying Dale as a gay man? Could it be, as this author would agree, that the
Boy Scouts were not concerned about the message they were sending, but that
they simply did not want gay members and this constitutional guise of an argu-
ment seemed the most likely to succeed?
126. Supra note 114 and accompanying text. Cf Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996). In this case, the Court struck down an amendment to the Colorado Con-
stitution. Id. at 626. Amendment Two precluded all governmental entities from
engaging in any activities that would protect a person from discrimination based
on his or her sexual orientation. Id. at 626-27. Here, the Court found that the
amendment "lack[ed] a rational relationship to legitimate state interests." Id. at
632. This Court, not more than five years ago, struck down a state constitutional
amendment because it lacked legitimate state interest. Id. Yet, in Dale, the Court
did not even mention, much less speculate what legitimate state interests NewJer-
sey could and does have in eradicating discrimination against gays with its Law
Against Discrimination. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5 (West 1993).
127. Romer, 517 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "But I had thought that one
could consider certain conduct reprehensible-murder, for example, or polyg-
amy, or cruelty to animals-and could exhibit even 'animus' toward such con-
duct." Id. at 644. In his dissent, Justice Scalia likens the animus towards homo-
sexuals to that of the animus towards murderers. Does this make sense? Is it really
true that people have the same type of moral disapproval towards one who takes
another's life as they do towards a gay person? Surely, that cannot be true. In an-
other illustrative opinion footnoted in the Dale dissent, gays were defiled in the
writings of the Court. In that case, the university had denied recognition to a stu-
dent gay rights organization. The student group argued that in doing so, the uni-
versity had violated its free speech and free association rights. The court of ap-
peals agreed with that argument. A dissent from denial of certiorari, citing the
university's argument, suggested that the proper analysis might well be as follows:
"[T]he question is more akin to whether those suffering from measles have a con-
stitutional right, in violation of quarantine regulations, to associate together and
with others who do not presently have measles, in order to urge repeal of a state
law providing that measle sufferers be quarantined." Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2478 n.30
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Univ. of Mo. v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080, 1084
(1978)). Here, in a dissent authored by ChiefJustice Rhenquist, joined by Justice
Blackmun, he likens a gay person to a person having measles. Id. While most stu-
dents of the law can appreciate useful analogies, is that a fair analogy? It is impor-
tant to note that Justice Blackmun's opinion on this issue changed in later years.
Just eight years later, Justice Blackmun dissented in Bowers, defending the right of
homosexuals to engage in sex in the privacy of their own homes. Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. 186, 214 (1986). In his famous dissent in this five to four decision,
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The Dale Court leaves the Boy Scouts with permission to ban
homosexuals from membership in the organization. 11 Until the
Court grants certiorari to this issue again, that will be the law of the
land. The real value of this article is not the criticism of the Court
supplemented with a healthy dose of moral outrage. Rather, the
question becomes, what happens next? In other words, do other
laws exist that may offer some recourse to prevent the Boy Scouts
from engaging in discriminatory practices? Here, our focus shifts
from the Dale case to state civil rights laws that protect citizens from
discrimination because of sexual orientation.
B. What Happens Next In Minnesota?
Everyday, more and more articles in the mainstream press ap-
pear about this now infamous Dale decision.3 ° Most of these arti-
he wrote that, "depriving individuals of the right to choose for themselves how to
conduct their intimate relationships poses a far greater threat to the values most
deeply rooted in our Nation's history than tolerance of nonconformity could ever
do." Id. Perhaps more notable than Justice Blackmun's dissent is Justice Powell's
change of opinion in Bowers. Justice Powell joined Justice White's majority opin-
ion rejecting a right to privacy for consensual homosexual sex. JOHN C. JEFFERIES,
JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 524 (1994). Four short years later in 1990, while
responding to a question at New York University Law School,Justice Powell said he
now regretted his vote and believed that the dissent "had the better of the argu-
ments." Id. at 530; see also Linda Greenhouse, Lewis Powell, Crucial Centrist Justice,
Dies at 90, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1998, at D19. His renouncement of his vote does
not change the status of Bowers, it is still the law of the Court. However, his re-
nouncement may indicate something more general about our present context.
That is, four years down the road in 2004, perhaps one of the Justices in the Dale
majority will realize that the dissent had the better of the arguments.
128. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2458.
129. The cities of Chicago, San Francisco, and San Jose, California have al-
ready informed local scout troops in those areas that they cannot use parks,
schools, and other city sites for scouting functions. Kate Zernike, Scouts'Successful
Ban on Gays is Followed by Loss in Support, N. Y. TIMES, August 29, 2000, at 1, avail-
able at http://www.nytimes. com/library/national/082900scouts-contribute.html
(on file with author). This is a difficult issue for public officials around the country
because they are caught in a precarious balancing act. On one side, they do not
want to eliminate scouting as a valuable opportunity for boys of all ages or violate
First Amendment principles. On the other side, if these public entities permit a
group that bans gays to use public facilities, they risk violating state and/or city
anti-discrimination statutes. Id. In fact, the American Civil Liberties Union filed a
lawsuit against the city of San Diego on August 28, 2000 praying for a federal court
to revoke a fifty year old contract that allows the Scouts to lease eighteen acres of
city land for $1 per year. Id. As this article describes, the Supreme Court's Dale
decision is not the end of this issue. The next section of this article will explore
the situation in Minnesota.
130. Pat Doyle, United Way to Allow Exclusions by Donors, MINNEAPOLIS STAR
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cles address the issue of private and public funding of the Boy
Scouts of America.' All of these articles suggest that public and
private support for the organization has and is continuing to
erode. 1"2 In light of these recent developments, two questions arise:
1) Can the state of Minnesota take any action? and 2) Should the
state of Minnesota take any action? All sides in this matter can de-
bate these questions vigorously, but this section of the article will
address the legal basis for the answer to these questions.
1. Can The State Of Minnesota Take Any Action?
Minnesota, like eleven other states, has broad anti-
discrimination laws that protect against discrimination based on
sexual orientation.3 3 Minnesota's Human Rights Act is one of the
TRIB., Sept. 6, 2000, at Al; Todd Nelson, United Way to Continue Supporting Boy
Scouts, SAINT PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Sept. 6, 2000, at B1; Anna Quindlen, The Right to
Be Ordinary, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 11, 2000, at 82; Zernike, supra note 129.
131. Supranote 130.
132. Supra note 130. In Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota, the United Way
instituted a new policy permitting donors to exclude specific organizations from
receiving their money. Doyle, supra note 130. Referring to the Dale case, Bill Rod-
riguez, Vice President of Marketing for United Way of St. Paul said, "There is no
doubt that the whole issue has helped precipitate this new policy ... it's not the
lone factor, but it's a significant one." Id. The local Indianhead Boy Scout Coun-
cil of St. Paul will continue to receive support from the local United Way, but do-
nors will have the option to exclude the group, an option that was not available
previously. Nelson, supra note 130, at B2. Further, the United Way of St. Paul's
continued support is somewhat unique because according to Nelson's article,
"Across the country, dozens of United Ways have cut off millions of dollars ear-
marked for the Boy Scouts, and several large companies such as Chase Manhattan
Bank, Textron Inc. and Levi Strauss & Co. have followed suit." Id. Further, Con-
necticut has banned state employees from giving charitable donations to the
Scouts through a state-run charity. Zernike, supra note 129. Other organizations
have turned to alternative methods in an attempt to encourage the Boy Scouts not
to discriminate. Id. Specifically, a United Way chapter in Rhode Island will re-
quire any Scout council seeking funding to sign a form stating that it will not dis-
criminate. Id. But as one can imagine, the Boy Scouts of America's national or-
ganization is not willing to endorse this action. In fact, if the Boy Scouts allowed
individual councils to sign non-discrimination pledges, this action could seriously
impair the BSA's future ability to contend that it has always maintained that ho-
mosexuality is not compatible with scouting. Id.
However, even though troops that disobey the national policy of dis-
crimination towards homosexuals could face eviction, local Boy Scout councils
have asked the national group to reconsider its decision. See Quindlen, supra note
130 at 82; Zernike, supra note 129 at 4.
133. The following provides an in-depth review of the type of protections
against sexual orientation discrimination that are in effect in these twelve states.
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 subd. 1 (1) (a)-(d) (membership in labor organiza-
tions); § 363.03 subd. 1(2)(a)-(c), (3)(a)(b), (4)(a)-(c) (employment); § 363.03
2090 [Vol. 27:3
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most comprehensive statutes legislating legal protection from dis-
crimination because of sexual orientation in public accommoda-
tions, employment, housing, public services, access to education,
and the granting of credit. Clearly, the Boy Scouts' eviction of
subd. 2(1)(a)-(c),(2)(a)-(c),(3)(a)(b), (4) (real property including housing); §
363.03 subd. 3(1) (public accommodations); § 363.03 subd. 4(1) (access to pub-
lic services); § 363.03 subd. 5(1)-(3) (access to education); § 363.03 subd. 8(1)
(granting credit) (West, WESTLAW through 1999 Reg. Sess.); CAL. GOV'T CODE §
12940(a) (employment); § 12940(b) (membership in labor organizations); §
12955(a)-(e),(h),(j)-() (different aspects of housing) (West, WESTLAW through
1999 Reg. Sess); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §46a-81b(a) (acceptance into associations
for licensed persons); §46a-81c (employment); §46a-81d(a) (public accommoda-
tions); §46a-81e (housing); §46a-81h(a) (equal employment in state agencies);
§46a-81i(a) (services of state agencies); §46a-81j(b) (job recruitment and place-
ment services provided by state agencies) (West, WESTLAW through Jan. 1, 2000);
HAW. REv. STAT. § 378-2(1) (A) (employment); § 378-2(1) (D) (membership in la-
bor organizations) (West, WESTLAW through 1999 Reg. Sess.); 2000 Me. Legis.
Serv. Act of April 7, 2000, ch. 629, sec. 8.5, tit. 5, § 4571 (employment); sec. 9.5, tit.
5, § 4572(1) (A)-(C) (employment and membership in labor organizations); sec.
14.5, tit. 5, § 4582 (different aspects of housing); sec 17.5, tit. 5, § 4592(1)(2)
(public accommodations); sec 18.5, tit. 5, § 4595 (granting of credit); MASs. GEN.
LAWS. ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(1) (employment); § 4(2) (membership in labor organi-
zations); § 4(3A) (insurance or bonding coverage); § 4(3B) (access to mortgages);
§ 4(3C) (6) (7) (7B) (8) (different aspects of fair housing); § 4(14) (granting credit)
(West, WESTLAW through 2000 Sess.); NEv. REV. STAT. § 613.330(1)(a)(b),
(2)(a)(b), (3)(a)(b), (4) (West, WESTLAW through 1999 Reg. Sess.) (employ-
ment); § 338.125 (1)(2) (contracts with the state); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-
A:7(I) (employment); § 354-A:7(II) (membership in labor organizations); § 354-
A:10(I)-(V), (VII) (different aspects of fair housing); § 354-A:17 (public accom-
modations) (West, WESTLAW through 1999 Reg. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4,
10:5-12(f) (1) (2) (public accommodations); § 10:5-4, 10:5-12(a) (c) (employment);
§ 10:5-12(b) (membership in labor organizations); § 10:5- 12(g)(1)-(3), (h)(1)-(3)
(different aspects of housing); § 10:5-12 (i) (1) (2), (k) (1) (financing of housing or
real property); § 10:5-12(m)(1) (granting of credit) (West, WESTLAW through
1999 Reg. Sess.); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-2 (public accommodations); § 23-17.16-
2(1) (in-home patient care); § 28-5-5 (equal employment); § 28-5-7 (employment);
§ 28-5.1-7(a) (state services); § 28-5.1-8(a) (state educational programs); § 34-37-
4.3 (granting credit); § 34-37-1 (a) (b) & 3 4 -37-4(a)-(c) (different aspects of fair
housing) (West, WESTLAW through 1999 Reg. Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §
961(6) (employment); tit. 9, § 4502(a) (public accommodations); tit. 21, §
1621 (b) (8) (A) (membership in labor organizations) (West, WESTLAW through
1999 Sess.); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 36.12(1) (admission to state college system); §
38.23(1) (admission to state technical college system); § 111.36(1)(d)(1) (em-
ployment), § 118.13(1) (public school) (West, WESTLAW through 1999 Act 75);
2000 Wis. Legis. Serv. 150, Act of May 10, 2000, sec. 383, § 66.40(2m), sec. 447, §
106.04(1) (housing).
134. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West, WESTLAW through 1999 Reg. Sess.)
For more detailed information, supra note 133 and accompanying text.
It is also interesting to note that Hennepin County, which includes the city of
Minneapolis, Minnesota was the first county to enact gay rights legislation in 1974.
See Note, Constitutional Limits on Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1905,
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Dale on the basis of his sexual orientation alone is discrimination
under Minnesota law. In City of Minneapolis v. Richardson's , the
Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted the Minnesota Human
Rights Act's use of the word "discrimination" to mean, "distinction
in treatment of individuals based upon impermissible or irrelevant
factors such as race, color, creed, sex, etc." 36 The court went on to
explain that to establish discrimination, it is necessary to show that
someone else in a similarly situated position that does not possess
the irrelevant trait is treated preferentially. 137 In the instant case,
Dale would have to show that he was treated differently than some-
one who was heterosexual in order to establish discrimination.
Obviously, this is not difficult to do considering that the Boy Scouts
admit that it discharged Dale because of his sexual orientation."' 8
Establishing discrimination alone is not enough for the State
of Minnesota to take action under statutory construct. Simply,
Minnesota would have to prove that the Boy Scouts discriminate
against gays and this discrimination violates a specific provision of
the Minnesota Human Rights Act. The most logical assertion that
the state could make is that the Boy Scouts' discriminatory policy
violates the public accommodations provision of the Act.'39 This
might sound hauntingly familiar to the Dale case, and we know that
the Supreme Court spoke on this issue and declared that private
organizations have a constitutional right to discriminate against
gays which should be granted deference over a state's anti-
discrimination public accommodation laws.
40
1908 n.23 (citing LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC., A NATIONAL
SUMMARY OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAws 6, 12 (1991)).
135. 239 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Minn. 1976).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 202.
138. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2450.
139. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 subd. 3(a) (1) (West, WESTLAW through 1999
Reg. Sess.). The statute reads in relevant part, "It is unfair discriminatory practice:
to deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation
because of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin, marital status,
sexual orientation, or sex ...." Id.
140. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446. It is important to note that the Supreme Court has,
in the past, held that private organizations that discriminate are not without con-
sequence. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-604 (1983). In
Bob Jones, the University believed that the Bible forbade interracial dating and
marriage. Id. at 580. In adherence of these tenets, the University excluded Afri-
can-Americans until 1971. Id. Subsequently, from 1971 to May 1975, the Univer-
sity only accepted applications from African-Americans married to other African-
Americans. Id. Finally, in May of 1975, the University abandoned its discrimina-
2092 [Vol. 27:3
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First, it is possible Minnesota would have come to the conclu-
sion that the Boy Scouts are not a private organization, thus render-
ing it susceptible to the public accommodations statute. In Wayne
v. Mastershield,141 the Court of Appeals of Minnesota recently held
that the determination of whether an entity is public or private
"hinges on two criteria: (1) the selectiveness of the group in the
admission of members; and (2) the existence of limits on the size
of the membership."1 42 In Wayne, Judge Toussaint held that apart-
ment complexes are not places of public accommodations under
the Minnesota Human Rights Act. 14 On the other hand, the court
in United StatesJaycees v. McClure held that the United States Jaycees
is a place of public accommodation because of the absence of se-
lection criteria, and the seemingly limitless membership goals.'"
From these cases, the standard for the determination in Min-
tory policy and allowed unmarried African-American students to enroll. Id. How-
ever, the University instituted a disciplinary rule resulting in expulsion for students
involved in a dating or marital relationship with someone "outside their own race."
Id. at 580-81. In response to these discriminatory (and repugnant) policies, the
Court affirmed the Internal Revenue Service's revocation of BobJones University's
tax-exempt status under § 501(c) (3). Id. at 605. Here, the Court demonstrated
that private organizations with flagrantly discriminatory policies are not necessarily
entitled to the same benefits as other non-discriminatory organizations.
141. 597 N.W.2d 917 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). Because the potential for re-
search in this area is vast and outside the scope of this paper, I focused on the In-
dianhead Council of the Boy Scouts of America because its headquarters are lo-
cated in St. Paul, Minnesota, the same city as William Mitchell College of Law.
The Indianhead Council Communications Director, Kent York, very recently
stated that it has never used sexual orientation as a basis for selecting or dismissing
scout leaders. Nelson, supra note 130, at B2. In addition to the absence of sexual
orientation as a criteria for selection for adult leaders, the Indianhead Council's
website states that its primary strategic vision for the year 2001 is to be recognized
as "a highly effective and accessible contemporary youth development organiza-
tion...." Strategic Vision-Indianhead Scouting 2001, at http://www.indian-
head.org/about/mission.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2000). From this widely dis-
seminated information, it is arguable that the Boy Scouts, specifically the Indian-
head Council, are not particularly selective about its membership, nor is it con-
cemed with the size of the organization. In fact, on the home page, the header of
the page states that "Indianhead Scouting/BSA: Serving youth in Minnesota
Counties of Ramsey, Washington, Chisago, Rice, Scott, Dakota, LeSueur, Anoka,
and the Wisconsin Counties of Pierce, St. Croix, Polk, and Burnett." Indianhead
ScoutingIBSA, at http://www.indianhead.org/ (last visited on Sept. 7, 2000). No-
where on the website is there mention of either selection criteria for scouts and
volunteer leaders, or mention of a limit to the amount of total members in the or-
ganization. Id.
142. Wayne, 597 N.W.2d at 921 (citing U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d
764, 770 (Minn. 1981)).
143. Wayne, 597 N.W.2d at 922.
144. McClure, 305 N.W.2d at 771, 774.
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nesota of a private organization is clear. Applying this standard to
the Boy Scouts, it is not at all implausible that the Boy Scouts could
be deemed a public organization.
Second, even if Minnesota concluded that the Boy Scouts are a
private organization and it can discriminate, the Minnesota Human
Rights Act certainly prohibits the state from giving a private dis-
criminatory group special privileges.14 The granting of these spe-
cial privileges would violate the Minnesota Human Rights Act be-. 146
cause Minnesota would be violating its own law. Therefore,
145. An in-depth look at these special privileges is outside the scope of this ar-
ticle; however, upon closer examination of these privileges, one would likely find
that many Boy Scout troops are sponsored by public entities, such as public
schools. This information is derived from the Boy Scouts' contention in its brief to
the Supreme Court that fewer than ten percent of troops are chartered to public
institutions. See United States Supreme Court Pet'rs Br. at 3, Boy Scouts of Am. v.
Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000). In this brief, the Boy Scouts assert that ninety per-
cent of troops are chartered by private organizations, and then offer no explana-
tion for the other ten percent of troops except to say that, "fewer than 10 percent
are chartered to public institutions." Id. Hence, assuming that Indianhead Coun-
cil would likely have a similar breakdown, it is fair to say that public institutions
sponsor approximately ten percent of the Council's troops. More telling than the
number of publicly owned and operated troops would be the number of members
in different types of troops. It is my contention, and further research is needed,
that one would find that the publicly sponsored troops are disproportionately lar-
ger in size than the privately sponsored troops. In other words, a Boy Scout troop
affiliated with a St. Paul middle school is likely to have a much broader base of po-
tential members, and therefore a much larger membership than a church spon-
sored troop. The significance of this is that in using this ten percent figure, the
Boy Scouts attempt to dismiss the public nature of its organization yet again. As
the Indianhead website offers, "[e]ach chartered organization using the Scouting
program provides a meeting place and adult volunteer leadership for its BSA
units." Supporting Scouting, at http://www.indianhead.org/joining/support.html
(last visited Sept. 7, 2000). Here, it is clear at the very least, a public school would
open its premises to allow a meeting of the Boy Scouts.
146. If Minnesota were to seek an injunction to disallow the Boy Scouts from
being sponsored by public institutions because of its discriminatory policy, this
would be a case of first impression in Minnesota. However, based on the statutory
language prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations, Minnesota would
likely succeed in obtaining relief. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 subd. 3(1) (West,
WESTLAW through 1999 Reg. Sess.). Simply, schools are obviously places of pub-
lic accommodation and if the state allows the premises and the name of a public
school to be used in conjunction with a discriminatory group's activities, the state
is violating its own law. The following cases uphold other provisions (besides sex-
ual orientation) of the Minnesota Human Rights Act: Dep't of Human Rights v.
Spiten, 424 N.W.2d 815, 820-21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding prohibition of
racial discrimination); Minnesota v. Parkshore Estates, Inc., 413 N.W.2d 269, 270
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding prohibition of age discrimination); Blanding v.
Sports & Health Club, Inc., 373 N.W.2d 784, 793 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (holding
that discrimination based on sexual orientation is a violation of Minneapolis Civil
2094 [Vol. 27:3
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Minnesota can take action. The state can rescind all special privi-
leges granted to the Boy Scouts because in continuing to allow the
Boy Scouts to use our public schools, parklands, and other public
venues, Minnesota is putting its imprimatur on the Boy Scouts' dis-
criminatory policy.
147
The Boy Scouts will argue that any prohibition on its use of. . 148
public schools or parklands is unconstitutional. While the Court
has held that content discrimination is unconstitutional in granting
the use of a public forum, both of the leading cases in this area
have involved religious organizations.
149
Two important issues distinguish these cases from the Dale
case. First, in Rosenberger, the Court writes in great detail about the
critical role that religion has played in our human history and uses
this as one justification for forbidding content discrimination. 0
Surely today, the Court would not laud the value of the history of
homophobia as a reason for allowing the Boy Scouts to use school
premises.
Second, neither of these cases involved a state with statutes
aimed at eliminating the actions in question. 15 1 In contrast, Minne-
sota does have a statute aimed at eliminating discrimination. Fur-
ther, in Lamb's Chapel, the Court recognized that it is of "consider-
able" importance to evaluate a state's interest in this type of use of
state property.152 Yet, the Court ignored its own advice, like in Dale,
and never considered New York's interest in restrictions on the use
of its property.
15
1
Rights ordinance).
147. As defined, the term imprimatur signifies "a general grant of approval;
commendatory license or sanction." BLACK'S LAW DIcrIoNARY 760 (7th ed. 1999).
148. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819,
831-835 (1995) (holding that a university cannot refuse to pay publishing costs of
newspaper because it contains religious editorials, if it has fund established to pay
for student publications); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
508 U.S. 384, 390 (1993) (holding that a public school who opens its doors for use
of the public cannot disallow certain groups to use the premises because of the
content of its message).
149. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 822-23; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 388.
150. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
151. Conversely, Minnesota does have an anti-discrimination statute aimed at
reducing sexual orientation discrimination. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West,
WESTLAW through 1999 Reg. Sess.).
152. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 391.
153. Id.
2001] 2095
27
LaMere: Constitutional Law—Scouting: Be Prepared Minnesota
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
2. Should The State Of Minnesota Take Any Action?
No one contests that the Boy Scouts are a valuable organiza-
tion to many youth, However, allowing the Scouts to continue to
use Minnesota's public resources in a different way than other or-
ganizations are permitted sends an undeniable message that the
state implicitly approves of the Boy Scouts' policies.154 From the
enactment of the first ordinance protecting gay rights in 1974 to
the addition of sexual orientation as a protected class to the Min-
nesota Human Rights Act in 1993, Minnesotans know and value the
importance of eradicating discrimination.1
5
V. CONCLUSION
"If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our
minds be bold."116 Being bold is sometimes difficult and sometimes
unpopular, but being bold signifies holding your ground with con-
fidence. Minnesota should be bold and prohibit the Boy Scouts
from using the state's resources to spread its message of intoler-
157
ance.
A particularly troublesome argument contends that disallow-
ing the Boy Scouts to use school premises and the revocation by
154. Although the Indianhead Council contends that it has never dismissed a
Scout leader because of sexual orientation, the Council's harassment policy may
tell another story. Nelson, supra note 130 at 2B. "It is the Indianhead Council's
policy to maintain an environment free from unlawful discrimination. The Indi-
anhead Council absolutely prohibits harassment on the basis of race, color, relig-
ion, gender, national origin, age, disability, status with respect to public assistance
or marital status by its staff, volunteers, and members." Indianhead Council of the
Boy Scouts of America Harassment Policy, at http://www.indianhead. org/ resource/
policy/harassment.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2000). Although the Council's asser-
tions of non-discrimination based on sexual orientation are likely true, its harass-
ment policy does not reflect this supposed commitment.
155. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000); Note, supra note
134, at 1908 n.23 (citing LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC., A
NATIONAL SUMMARY OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAws 6, 12 (1991)).
156. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2459 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
157. The Boy Scouts are a great organization in most Americans' minds help-
ing hundreds of thousands of youth every year. It simply has a bad policy. Ideally,
the Boy Scouts would recognize the harm of its policy on its own, or at least in re-
sponse to its diminished financial support. If the Boy Scouts were to change its
position on gays, it could avoid this whole issue, which, according to the Scouts
themselves, is exactly what they want to do. Nelson, supra note 130, at BI. "This
whole issue of sexual orientation is something we'd rather not be involved in." Id.
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corporate sponsors will only affect inner city youth. Suburban
troops are self-supporting and the members can easily pay for uni-
forms and equipment.59 However, the inner city youth will suffer
because corporations fund its troops.' 6° If these unfortunate facts
are true, this just demonstrates that the Boy Scouts' policy hurts not
only gays but also hurts inner city youth in continuing to enforce its
discriminatory policy. The reason this argument is troublesome is
because it shifts the blame onto the government and corporations.
Instead of faulting the Boy Scouts for a bad policy, the author ar-
gues that corporations should simply look the other way, and con-
tinue to support the Boy Scouts.
As more and more funding dries up for the Boy Scouts and
pressure mounts against the organization to change its policy, there
are strong indications that the Boy Scouts are responding.'1 For
example, in St. Paul, Minnesota, the Indianhead Council has
touted the fact that sexual orientation "has never been a basis for
selecting or dismissing leaders., 162 In New York, one of the local
Boy Scout Councils wrote a letter to the Schools Chancellor pledg-
ing, "not to discriminate against gays."'163 Both of these Boy Scout
responses came in the wake of the loss of support and funding.
Clearly, the Boy Scouts have noticed.
It is imperative to realize that the Boy Scouts have a constitu-
tional right to freedom of expressive association. The Boy Scouts
can discriminate against gays. However, the Boy Scouts should be
prepared to contend with legal, financial, and ethical challenges that
are sure to boldly persevere.
158. Katherine Kersten, Commentary: Turning Scouts into Pariahs, MINNEAPOLIS
STAR TRIB., Oct. 4, 2000, at Al9.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Thomas J. Lueck, Scout Councils Urged to Defy Policy on Gays, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 2000, at B1; Nelson, supra note 130.
162. Nelson, supra note 130, at Bi.
163. Lueck, supra note 161, at B1.
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